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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the various courses of action which may
be taken by international organizations or states, either individu-
ally or collectively, in response to breaches of international treaties
or agreements or of applicable rules of customary international
law. It also considers the factors and the circumstances which
motivate the espousal of a specific type of response.
An assertion that an act or omission constitutes a breach of a
treaty or agreement may simply be an allegation, unverified and
unsubstantiated, or it may be one which has been fully substanti-
ated or is supported by the decision of a duly constituted interna-
tional agency or tribunal. In this respect it is to be noted that
particular types of responses to treaty breaches, even those which
have been confirmed by adjudication, may be illegal. For these
and other reasons pertinent to matters here discussed it is necessary
that the teims "response" and "sanctions" be defined.
II. RESPONSES AND SANCTIONS
A response is any act or omission, whether legal or illegal, and
whether of a forcible, coercive, detrimental, or peaceful nature, to
which states have recourse, either individually or collectively, to
redress a breach, or a threatened breach, of the express or implied
provisions of an international agreement or a rule of customary
international law.'
*Spedal Consultant to The Judge Advocate General of the Army on Private
International Law Matters.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the
views of the Department of the Army or of any other Government Agency.
'Institute of Defense Analysis for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Summary Report, Woods Hole Summer Study on Verification and Response
in Disarmament Agreements 2-3 n.2 (1962), defines a response for purposes of arms
control and disarmament agreements as "any course of action taken by a nation or
an international body on the basis of information indicating that another party to an
arms control or disarmament agreement is not acting in conformance with objectives
contained in or implied by the agreement.'
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A sanction is any forcible, coercive, or detrimental measure au-
thorized by international law, by which an international body or
states, either individually or collectively, seek to deter, to rectify,
or to punish another state or group of states for improper or illegal
conduct which they fail or refuse to rectify.2
A sanction, therefore, is a particular type of response. It is one
which is authorized by, and which is taken in support of, interna-
tional law, either customary or conventional.3 Responses which
are proscribed by international law, including those which may be
expressly provided for in particular international agreements, are
illegal acts for which sanctions are authorized and may legally
be imposed.
As a general rule the purpose of responses and sanctions is to
prevent the commission of an illegal act, or to preclude a trans-
gressor from attaining his objective, or to deny a transgressor any
advantage or benefit which he has or may obtain from his illegal
acts. The primary objectives of responses and sanctions, properly
considered, are the suppression of violence, and the insurance of
peace and adherence to the orderly process of law.4 Sanctions are
rarely imposed for punitive purposes. In those instances in which
punitive sanctions have been imposed they have generally failed
to produce the desired results. In some instances they have pro-
vided the foundation for lasting and deep-seated resentments as, for
2 "In the original sense of the word, a sanction is a penalty provided as a means
of enforcing obedience to a law. In jurisprudence, a law is said to have a sanction
vhen there is a State which will intervene if the law is disobeyed." The Pocket Law
Lexicon (8th ed. 1951). Fried states that the word "sanction" is "the name given
to penalties applied by, or on behalf or at the request of, an international organization
representing the international community, against a state or group which has violated
(or threatens to violate) an international obligation of its own, and especially the
obligation to refrain from military aggression," 24 Encyclopedia Americana, Sanctions,
International 248 (1964 ed.). Mitrany observes that the word sanction "has now
passed into general usage for describing collectively the various means prescribed
or contemplated for enforcing international covenants. In the English language the
word has meant till now merely approval or confirmation. Its new sense. .. is taken
from the French, in which language 'sanction' signifies a constrained or coercive
measure which prevents or punishes violators and ensures execution." Mitrany, The
Problem of International Sanctions 1 (1925). A report by a Group of Members of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1938 in a study entitled "International
Sanctions," concluded that a proper definition of sanctions for international affairs
would be "action taken by members of the international community against an in-
fringement, actual or threatened, of the law." Id. at 16. Wild defines a treaty sanction
as "the threat of a certain measure or measures either in the treaty itself or in in-
ternational law, which induces conformity to and which tends to prevent the violation
of a treaty." Wild, Sanctions and Treaty Enforcement 196 (1934).
3 Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Sanctions 4 (1938).
4 Id. at 5, 13.
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example, in the case of the sanctions imposed upon Germany by
the Versailles Treaty. It is essential, therefore, that any response
or sanction which may be imposed be compatible with the Charter
of the United Nations and be the minimum necessary to accom-
plish legitimate peaceful ends.
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations
specifies that in the maintenance of international peace and security
the United Nations will
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peace-
ful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international dis-
putes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
The preventive and enforcement aspects of the Charter are
emphasized and articulated in Article 39 which vests in the Security
Council the right to "determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide
what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security," as provided in Articles 41 and 42 of
the Charter.
Responses and sanctions may be considered as the means by
which states are induced to comply with their general international
obligations as members of the international community, and the
specific obligations which they have voluntarily assumed by treaty
provision.6 Conversely, responses and sanctions may be considered
as measures the fear of which may deter states from breaching
their obligations under international law.
A. Means by Which States are Induced to Comply with Treaties
or are Deterred from Treaty Breaches.
The means by which states are induced to comply with their
international obligations, or may be deterred from breaching them,
are conditioned by, and are predicated upon, a number of internal
and external factors which are in part both psychological and sub-
jective in nature.
These means include: (1) the fear of war or other forcible
measures of reprisal; (2) the fear of nonforcible measures of re-
taliation, such as embargoes, an international boycott, or the ter-
mination of a treaty; (3) fear of such ultimate consequences that
what may be gained through a breach of the law may be negated
or outweighed by the loss that results from action which may be
I See Wild, op. cit. supra note A at 3, 60.
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taken by the victim of the breach or by the international com-
munity; (4) the fear of the disapprobation of the international
community or of a hostile or adverse public opinion, international,
domestic, or both; (5) the fear that the victim of the breach may
terminate other agreements between them which are beneficial;
(6) the fear of establishing a bad international reputation; (7) the
fear that other benefits under the agreement which has been
breached may be terminated; (8) the fear that a breach may not be
condoned or cannot be justified on equitable grounds before the
international community; (9) the fear that the breach may pre-
clude the conclusion in the future of other agreements which it
desires to negotiate with the 'victim; (10) thefear that sanctions
specified in the treaty may be imposed because of the breach; e.g.,
forfeiture of property held in escrow to assure compliance; referral
of the breach to an arbital tribunal or to an international court of
justice for adjudication; (11) the fear that the nature of the
breach makes it one which is a threat to world peace and as such
would be subject to action by the Security Council or the General
Assembly, and for which military or non-military sanctions could
be imposed under the provision of the Charter of the United
Nations."
B. Factors Conditioning the Effectiveness of Inducement or
Deterrent Measures.
The effectiveness of these deterrent factors depends in large
measure upon the particular facts and circumstances which exist
at the time that a breach is contemplated or accomplished. For
example, the comparative strength of the parties concerned and
that of their allies, their geographic location, the probability that
an effective response will be forthcoming from either the victim
of the breach or the international community; the general interna-
tional political situation and, particularly, the political conditions
which exist in the territory of the intended victim; the probability
of attaining lasting benefits from the breach; the willingness of the
transgressor to assume any and all possible consequences which
may result from the breach; the extent to which a breach may be
plausibly justified on equitable or other grounds to the international
community; the probability that the victim of the breach will
absorb the breach to preserve other benefits which he can continue
to enjoy under other provisions of the agreements which have not
been breached; and the extent to which the victim is determined
to preserve the agreement are all germane.
-8 See in this-respect, Wild, op. cit. supra note 2; at 60-61; Ilde, "After Detection-
What?" 30 Foreign Affairs 208-13 (1961).
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Wild 7 has aptly pointed out that the problem of sanctions as
applied to treaty provisions is both legal and political. It is legal in
that it relates to the enforcement of a legal obligation. It is political
because the efficacy and the continuation of the treaty depend upon
the attitude of the contracting parties toward the sanctity of
treaties, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the revision and ter-
mination of treaties, and the settlement of disputes. Responses and
sanctions, in addition to their treaty enforcement purpose, are, of
course, also intended to perpetuate the status quo which existed
at the time the treaty was concluded and which, for various reasons,
is now no longer considered to be satisfactory or beneficial to certain
of the parties. It is possible, therefore, that a treaty which is obso-
lete or detrimental to the general welfare, or which constitutes a
threat to the peace and security of the international community
may continue in effect against the will of one of the contracting
parties, because of the fear of responses and sanctions. This possi-
bility exists particularly with respect to treaties which make no pro-
vision for their revision, renegotiation, or termination, and under
which one or more of the parties is unwilling to consent to revision
or termination even though considerations of equity might so
dictate.
Wild has observed that the pacta sunt servanda doctrine
espouses the impossible or the impracticable in that it seeks "to
dam the stream rather than to canalize it" and tends "inevitably
to place a straight-jacket upon the relations of states . . . . The
result has been an impossible rigid principle emphasized to the
detriment of the international community." 8
In the absence of a general recognition of the counterbalanc-
ing doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the principle of modification, or
the existence of an international legislature empowered to correct
inequities, it may be said that the doctrine pacta sunt servanda,
which was designed originally to promote international order and
stability, in fact fosters just the opposite-violence on the part of
states that seek to unshackle themselves from absolute and detri-
mental treaty bonds.
This basic problem reflects the need for an international legis-
lature empowered to supervise the making of treaties, to review and
revise treaty obligations, to void those that are inequitable, and to
control the response and sanctioning procedures. The sanctioning
of treaty breaches can only be practical and efficacious when treaty
obligations have been given necessary flexibility through interna-
7 Wild, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7-8.
8 Id. at 13-16.
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tional legislation and judicial development.9 Sanctions and revisions
are closely allied topics: sanctions serve to maintain and enforce
order while revisions provide for change. Both are essential to a
peaceful and progressive international community.10
A world government capable of attaining these results is now
only an ideal. Until perfected the resolution of the problem of
responses and sanctions will in large measure rest upon the decisions
of international tribunals, -effective collective enforcement measures,
the conclusion of treaties which expressly recognize the need for
revision or provide for termination on equitable grounds, and the
establishment of international agencies which are empowered to
determine with finality issues both legal and political on the basis
of justice.
States will comply with treaties only as long as they consider
them to be fair and beneficial. Treaties which are not so considered
will, as a general rule, be breached regardless of any special sanc-
tioning procedures and the probability of their invocation. When
treaties impinge upon national interests, threats and coercion can-
not be relied upon to deter their breach.' This is evidenced by the
failure of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-
Kellogg Pact of 1928 to deter the Germans from breaching the
Treaty of Versailles or the Japanese from resorting to forceful
measures in Manchuria in the 1930's. Furthermore, the ultimate
effectiveness of sanctions is dependent in large part upon the will of
the international community. This will, however, is elusive because
of the varying interests and aspirations of individual members, their
evaluations of the equities which are involved in the breach of a
particular treaty obligation, and the probability that the interests
of justice will be served through the application of sanctions.
The primary objective of purposeful responses to treaty viola-
tions is preservation of the treaty, not coercion or punishment with
the attendant risk of war, unless, of course, such forcible sanction-
ing action is required to protect vital security interests which no
lesser response or sanction can preserve. As a general rule, there-
fore, only resort to non-forcible responses and sanctions appears
practical and feasible.
Breaches of international obligations, customary or conven-
tional, may be classed as substantive or procedural, and they may
be considered as anticipatory or constructive.
Substantive breaches, generally speaking, are breaches of those
provisions of international law which establish rights and benefits.
9Id. at 20-25.
10 Id. at 27.
11 Id. at 210.
[Vol. 26
TREATY VIOLATIONS
They are breaches of the fundamental provisions of international
law or the very objectives for which an agreement was concluded,
for example, the use of atomic weapons in violation of an arms
control and disarmament agreement concluded to outlaw atomic
war or the refusal to arbitrate a dispute in violation of an agreement
which was concluded for that purpose.
Procedural breaches are those which relate to the manner or
the means by which the substantive provision, the objectives of
international law generally, or of treaties in particular, are to be
attained, or by which the benefits contemplated by the agreement
are to be verified or protected, such as breaches of the provisions
of an arms control and disarmament agreement which require
reports of activities, the facilitation of inspections and verification
procedures, and the interrogation of witnesses with respect to sus-
pected violations of the agreement. The tactics of the North
Koreans in frustrating the inspection and verification procedures
of the Korean Armistice Agreement provide examples of proce-
dural breaches.
Anticipatory or constructive breaches are those committed
before there is a present duty of performance under international
law generally, or the provisions of a treaty in particular. Such a
breach may be the outcome of words or conduct which evidence an
intention to refuse performance of a duty in the future as, for
example, notice to one contracting party by another that it will
not comply with its commitment to come to the other party's
defense should it be the object of an armed attack.
Responses which arise incident to breaches of customary or
conventional law may be categorized according to their intended
purpose as anticipatory, preventive, remedial, or punitive.
Anticipatory responses are those intended to deter a contract-
ing party from committing a breach when there is substantive
evidence-words or conduct-that the party is about to breach
its obligations, as, for example, by military preparations for aggres-
sive purposes or conduct which evidences an intention to disregard
future treaty obligations to which it is committed. 12
Preventive responses or sanctions are intended upon their im-
position to deter a contracting party which has already breached
the provisions of the agreement from committing further breaches.13
Corrective, remedial, or restorative responses are intended pri-
marily to restore the status quo. A response of this nature is in-
tended to insure that the benefits which were visualized by the
12See Royal Institute of International Affairs, supra note 3, at 1.
13See Fisher, "Internal Enforcement of International Rules" in Disarmament:
Its Politics and Economics 107-08 (Melman ed. 1962).
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treaty are realized. Examples would be the refusal by a victim of
a breach to continue to comply with his reciprocal obligation under
the breached treaty, or a response by the victim which negates the
benefit which the transgressor would otherwise obtain. The U.N.
Command's response to the violations of the Korean Armistice
Agreement pertaining to the introduction of weapons and replace-
ment weapons was, in essence, correction through reciprocal non-
compliance.1 4 Remedial response may also be used to restore to the
victim of a breach all the benefits which he was denied and to
provide him compensation for damage suffered because of the
breach. The U.N. Command's response to breaches by the North
Koreans of the Korean Armistice Agreement were in part
restorative. 15
A response or sanction, if in some measure intended as punish-
ment or retribution, is termed punitive. Generally, peace treaties
are partially punitive in purpose and nature.16
III. RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
A. Responses Available to States Individually
Individual states may respond to violations or alleged viola-
tions of international agreements in several ways. The responses
may range from no action whatsoever to war. Some of the responses
which states are capable of making, however, are not authorized by
international law. A response which is illegal constitutes conduct
which is itself sanctionable. Responses which are authorized by
international law are, for purposes of this paper, referred to as
sanctions; those which are illegal, as sanctionable responses.
The various responses and the circumstances under which
recourse to them would be illegal are considered below. Under cer-
tain circumstances, either through fear of unfavorable consequences
or because the breach is accidental or inconsequential, or because
the victim of the breach, whether the breach be minor or serious,
does not desire to jeopardize the continuance of other provisions of
the breached agreement from which it derives benefit, it is possible
that a state may make no response to breaches of international
agreements. A failure to make a response is sanctionable only when
the failure to take action is itself a breach of a treaty obligation.
Thus, a party to a multilateral non-aggression treaty which is ob-
14 Summary Report, Woods Hole Summer Study on Verification and Response
in Disarmament Agreements 10 (1962).
15 See Henkin, "Enforcement of Arms Control: Some Basic Considerations,"
Annex Vol. II, Woods Hole Study on Verification and Response in Disarmament
Aggreements 42-43 (1962).
16 Id. at 42-43.
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ligated thereby to provide military assistance to another party to
the treaty should that party be the object of an armed attack,
would be in breach of the treaty should it fail to comply with its
obligations. Its failure to comply with its treaty commitment
under these circumstances would constitute a sanctionable breach.
A member state of the U.N. would be in breach of its treaty obliga-
tion should it refuse when called upon by the Security Council
under Articles 41 or 42 of the U.N. Charter to take measures not
involving the use of armed force against another state for a purpose
specified in Article 39.
1. Pacific Settlement of Disputes
a. Responses of a Political or Diplomatic Nature
(1) Negotiation.
Negotiation, the simplest method of resolving differences, is
also the most effective. It is the method which most treaties of
pacific settlement recognize as the first measure which disputants
are to take in the settlement of their differences. The importance
and effectiveness of this method of resolving disputes is not fully
appreciated. Neither has it been stressed or perfected to the full
extent of its potential. The vast majority of disputes are settled
satisfactorily by negotiation, and many of those that are not so
settled would probably not have become acute had they been left
for compromise at the diplomatic level.17 Most treaties which pro-
vide for compulsory arbitration or judicial settlement specify, as
a condition precedent to such settlement, that a showing be made
that their settlement by negotiation was attempted but was unsuc-
cessful.'8 Article 40 of the U.N. Charter also exhorts the parties
to that Charter to resort to negotiation before they have recourse
to the Security Council. Negotiation is effective because it is con-
ducive to compromise and concessions. 19 Additionally, it provides
a means whereby the parties may alter, as between themselves, the
rules of law upon which their dispute rests.20
(2) Good Offices and Mediation.
It is possible that disputes which have not been settled through
negotiation, either because the parties have failed to reach an
172 Wheaton, International Law 2 (7th ed. Keith 1944). See 2 Oppenheim,
International Law 6-7 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).
1s Gould, An Introduction to International Law 540 (1957). See the General Act
of Geneva (1929), and the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, Jan.
5, 1929, 49 Stat 3153, T.S. No. 886, 130 L.N.T.S. No. 135; The Hague Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779,
T.S. No. 392; 4 Hudson, International Legislation 2529.44 (1932).
19 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 7.20 Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 541.
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agreement or because one or both of the parties refused to attempt
a settlement in this manner may nevertheless be brought to a
negotiated settlement through an offer by a third state of its good
offices or through its mediation. Such an offer may have been
tendered with or without any solicitation from either of the disput-
ing states. Good offices or mediation may also be tendered or
provided by an organ of the U.N. or by some other international
organization or agency.
In 1937, the war between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Gran
Chaco was brought to a conclusion through the mediation efforts
of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay.2' In
1949, the hostilities in Palestine were concluded through the efforts
of mediators-Count Bernadotte and later Dr. Ralph Bunch-who
had been appointed by the General Assembly of the U.N. in 1948.22
Good offices consist of acts which may bring the disputing parties
together for negotiation. In mediation the third state actually takes
part and conducts negotiations between the disputing states on the
basis of proposals which are made by the mediator state.2 3 In the
Dogger Bank incident of 1904 it was through the mediation of
France that Great Britain and Russia agreed upon the establish-
ment of an International Commission of Inquiry for the purpose
of resolving a dispute between them that might have led to war. 4
(3) Commissions of Inquiry.
Disputing states which are unwilling to entrust the adjudication
of their dispute to an arbitral tribunal or to a court are often
willing to empower a Commission of Inquiry to ascertain the facts
of the dispute so that the parties may determine, on this basis, the
legal effect which they will accord to the facts as found. Generally,
it is the duty of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circum-
stances of a case and to issue a report thereon which is limited to
a statement of facts. The findings of the Commission do not have
the character of an award and the parties are free to give to the
statement of facts rendered whatever effect they desire.2 5
(4) Conciliation.
Under this form of response parties may refer their dispute to
21 Documents on International Affairs 538-54 (Heald ed. 1936).
22 See Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," 454 Int'l Conc. 603 (Oct.
1949).
23 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 10. For instances of meditation see 2
Wheaton, op. cit. supra note 17, at 4-8.
2 4 Scott, Hague Court Reports 403 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1905). See also 2 Oppen-
heim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 11, 13. At the Hague Conference in 1899 the fact-
finding agencies achieved the status of a formal international institution. See Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra note 18.
25 See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17,-at 12-16.
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a Commission to whom they give the duty of ascertaining the facts
and submitting a report which contains proposals for the settlement
of the dispute. The report, however, does not have the binding
character of an award or judgment. Conciliation differs from Inquiry
in that it enlists the active services of a Commission in bringing
the disputants to an agreement. It differs from arbitration and
judicial settlement, which will be discussed later, in that under
conciliation the disputants have no legal obligation to adopt pro-
posals which are suggested to them. The underlying features of
the Bryan Conciliation Treaties of 1914 were the establishment of
permanent conciliation committees and a provision for a cooling-
off period, the latter being a device to prevent the parties from
resorting to hostilities until after the publication of the report of
the conciliation commission. The cooling-off principle was incor-
porated in the Covenant of the League of Nations which forbade
resort to war for a period of three months after the receipt of a
Council report or an arbitral or judicial award.2"
Although many post-World War I treaties provided for con-
ciliation, recourse to it has been comparatively rare, 7 probably
because of the ready availability of the more perfected and varied
machinery of the League of Nations and the United Nations for
the peaceful resolution of disputes.2"
(5) Recourse to the United Nations.
Members of the U.N. have agreed under the Charter to resolve
their disputes by peaceful means. To insure the attainment of this
objective the U.N. Charter provides for action by the Security
Council in the event of threats to, or breaches of, the peace. The
Council is also empowered to investigate disputes and situations to
determine whether they endanger the peace and to recommend
appropriate methods for the settlement of disputes. The General
Assembly may also make recommendations for peaceful resolution
of problems or situations which are likely to impair the general
welfare, or the friendly relations between states, except in cases in
which the Security Council is seized of the matter.
A member of the U.N. may also bring a dispute or a situation
which is dangerous to peace to the attention of the Security Coun-
cil or the General Assembly. If the Security Council considers that
a dispute which is not settled by the procedures recommended in
Article 33 (negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra-
tion, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means) may endanger the peace, it may
26 Id. at 15-20; Gould, op. cit. .supra note 18, at 543-44.
27 Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 544-45.
28 See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 18-20.
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intervene and recommend an appropriate means of settlement.
It may recommend that a dispute be settled by the International
Court of Justice as suggested by Article 36. It may also employ
military or nonmilitary measures of coercion to deal with threats
to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, as it did
in the recommendation of July 27, 1950, passed in the absence of
the Soviet delegation, that members take action necessary to repel
North Korean aggression.
The General Assembly has now taken upon itself the power to
consider and make recommendations (which are not binding on
the members) for collective measures whenever the Security Coun-
cil's Permanent Members are divided and thus unable to meet their
responsibilities under the Charter. This device has enabled the
General Assembly to avoid inaction by the international commu-
nity which would otherwise result from the recourse by one of the
Permanent Members of the Council to its veto powers. 29
The Secretary General of the U.N. has recently assumed an
important role in the maintenance of peace. This development was
dictated in large measure by the cold war, mutual nuclear deter-
rence, and the legal and other impediments to an effective func-
tioning of the Security Council and the Assembly in the preserva-
tion and the restoration of peace. Since 1956, when the General
Assembly created a U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East
which gave to the Secretary General the responsibility of estab-
lishing and directing the Force, the Secretary General has been
given heavier and heavier peacekeeping responsibilities. To date the
office of the Secretary General is itself a significant factor in diplo-
matic negotiations. It has been aptly stated that the Secretary
General "serves as a catalyst in facilitating quiet (private) diplo-
macy" 8o either on his own initiative or at the request of the parties
to an issue. It was through the Secretary General's good offices that
quiet negotiations were undertaken between the United States and
Russia during the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962 and it was the
Secretary General who facilitated an exchange of views and pro-
vided suggestions on means for reconciliation. Since the Secretary
General has but one interest, the maintenance of peace, he provides
a unique factor which not only facilitates diplomatic negotiations,
but in some measure precludes the possibility that negotiations on
important matters may be hastily terminated.
(6) Appeal to Public Opinion.
Public opinion in some instances acts as a deterrent to breaches
29 See Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 568-70; 2 Oppenhein, op. cit. supra note
17, at 96-120.30 Hovet, "United Nations Diplomacy," XVII J. Int'l Aff. No. 1, at 34-35 (1963).
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of treaties. No state which persistently refuses to abide by its
treaty commitments can expect to be able to maintain or develop
essential treaty relationships or to retain good standing in the
international community. The deterrent effect of public opinion
is clearly evidenced by the effort that states which are accused of
breaches expend denying, explaining, or justifying international law
breaches which they are alleged to have committed.3 1
In 1907 Secretary of State Elihu Root, commenting upon the
binding effect of international law, concluded "that the difference
between municipal and international law, in respect to the exist-
ence of forces compelling obedience, is more apparent than real,
and that there are sanctions for the enforcement of international
law no less real and substantial than those which secure obedience
to municipal law."'32 He observed that it would be a mistake to
assume that the
sanction which secures obedience to the laws of the state con-
sists exclusively or chiefly of the pains and penalities imposed
by the law . . .for its violation. It is only in exceptional cases
that men refrain from crime through fear of fine or imprisonment.
In the vast majority of cases men refrain from criminal conduct
because they are unwilling to incur in the community in which
they live the public condemnation and obloquy which would follow
a repudiation of the standards of conduct prescribed by that com-
munity for its members. . . .Not only is the effectiveness of
the punishments demanded by law against crime derived chiefly
from the public opinion which accompanies them, but those
punishments themselves are but one form of the expression of
public opinion. Laws are capable of enforcement only so far
as they are in agreement with the opinions of the community
in which they are to be enforced. As opinion changes old laws
become obsolete and new standards force their way into the
statute books. Laws passed, as they sometimes are, in advance of
public opinion ordinarily wait for this enforcement until the
progress of opinion has reached recognition of their value. The
force of law is in the public opinion which prescribes it.33
The effectiveness of public opinion as a deterrent to breaches
of agreements, however, has always been debatable. It is "an amor-
phous concept," 34 and being so it is difficult to determine to what
31Brierly, "Sanctions," 17 Transact. Grot. Soc'y 67, at 68 (1932), states that in
international law the cause of obedience is simply the force of opinion, the conviction
of the majority of the states that obedience to law is not a matter of individual choice,
but is obligatory. Sanctions, he states, however highly organized, can never be stronger
than the conviction upon which they rest. See Hovet, supra note 30, at 31.32 Root, "The Sanctions of International Law," Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law 14, 16 (1908).
33 Id. at 16-17.
34 Ikle, "After Detection-What?" 39 Foreign Affairs 209 (1961).
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extent it could injure or deter a violator or a potential violator of
agreements which pertain to such important matters as arms con-
trol or disarmament. It has been said that one reason opinion is
so impotent is that "it has a very short memory." The recent
Hungarian revolution is an illustration. Furthermore, opinion can
be brought into play effectively only when unequivocal evidence
exists to support an alleged breach. Such evidence is usually un-
obtainable or, if obtainable, is so technical that the public is gen-
erally unable fully to comprehend or evaluate it.35
On occasions domestic public opinion may in fact preclude
the application of effective sanctions even when recourse to them
would be in the best public interest. Public opinion may even be
responsible for breaches of international commitments or responses
which are ineffectual." Two examples of such results are Britain's
reluctance to rearm in response to German violations of the Ver-
sailles Treaty and Britain's unwillingness to impose effective an-
ticipatory economic sanctions upon Italy in 1934 when it was
evident beyond doubt that Italy would attack Ethiopia in violation
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is probable, further-
more, that the imposition of sanctions, or the threat thereof, for
breaches of international obligations would serve only to unify
public opinion within the transgressor state and, as such, provide
to that state the support it needs to combat the sanctions' effective-
ness.
(7) Non-Recognition or the Withdrawal of Recognition of a
Government.
Under particular circumstances non-recognition, or the with-
drawal of recognition, of a government may serve as an effective
political measure in the enforcement of treaty obligations. It can
be employed in instances where revolution results in a radical
change in government as a means of motivating that government,
for example, to respect the treaties which were concluded by its
predecessor, or in retaliation should that government refuse to re-
spect the treaty obligations which have been assumed by the state
under its prior form of government.3 7
b. Recourse to Judicial Procedures.
(1) Arbitration.
Arbitration is the voluntary settlement of a dispute between
states by means of a legal decision reached by one or more um-
a5Id. at 212.
3ORoyal Institute of International Affairs, supra note 3, at 137.
37 For a discussion of the political and legal aspects of the non-recognition of
governments see Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 241-58; 1 Oppenheim, International
Law, 129-39 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
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pires, or by a tribunal (other than the International Court of
Justice) which is selected by the parties to the dispute. The award
of an arbitral tribunal is based on law, just as is the decision
of the International Court of Justice, unless the parties to arbi-
tration stipulate otherwise. If the parties so desire, however, the
dispute may be settled on the basis of equity and justice or on
other rules specified in the treaty of arbitration for the special
case. An arbitral award is final if the arbitration treaty does not
provide to the contrary, and it is binding on the parties if the
arbitrators have fulfilled in all respects their duties under the ar-
bitration treaty and have reached their decision in full indepen-
dence. Should a party to a valid arbitral award fail to comply with
the award, the other party would have the right to enforce it by
such compulsory means as are authorized by international law. 8
Awards rendered in excess of the powers conferred upon the arbi-
trators or which are tainted with fraud, however, are null and void.39
(2) International Court of Justice.
The parties may submit their disputes for adjudication to the
International Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the court is
based upon the consent of states given either generally in advance
or ad hoc upon the occurrence of a dispute. The jurisdiction of the
court is voluntary with respect to those cases which are referred
to it by special agreements. The jurisdiction of the court is obliga-
tory, either by special provisions to that effect in treaties, or by
virtue of the so-called "optional clause" of Article 36 of the statute
of the International Court of Justice which permits declarations by
states that they consent in relation to other states which also
consent to the same obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court in all or any of four types of legal disputes involving
(1) the interpretation of a treaty, (2) a question of international
law, (3) the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation, and (4) the
nature and extent of the reparations to be made for the breach
of an international obligation. Many states which have accepted
the "optional clause" have attached broad reservations such as
the United States' Connally Reservation. These reservations may,
of course, be invoked against the reserving state by the other
party to the dispute.
The court may also render advisory opinions when they are
sought by the General Assembly, the Security Council, other or-
38 See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 24-28.
39 For a discussion of the problem of an alleged exercise of excessive jurisdiction
by an arbitral tribunal and instances of exercise of excess jurisdiction see Gould, op.
cit. supra note 18, at 547-52; 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 27-29.
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gans of the United Nations, and specialized agencies authorized
by the General Assembly to ask for such opinions. The advisory
opinions are designed to aid the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly in performing duties of conciliation by providing
legal opinions on disputed points of law. The court under Article
38 of the statute may apply (1) international conventions, (2)
international custom, (3) the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations, and (4) certain judicial decisions and the
teachings of publicists. Additionally, the court may, if the parties
agree, decide cases ex aequo et bono.
The judgments of the court are final and without appeal ex-
cept insofar as the rules permit interpretation and revisions of
decisions. Except for a few cases, judgments of the court have in
the past been executed without serious difficulties. Under Article
94 of the Charter of the United Nations, a litigant may appeal
to the Security Council for action to enforce a court judgment
in its favor. The Security Council, if it sees fit, can take such
measures as may be required to secure execution of the court's
judgment. °
2. Coercive Settlement of Disputes, Unfriendly or
Forceful Acts Short of War.
The coercive measures short of war 41 to which states may
have recourse for breaches of treaty obligations include retortion
and reprisal. Retortion is an act which, although legal, is discour-
teous, unfriendly, or inequitable. It is an act which a state may
take in retaliation for the same or a similar type of act by an-
other state. Ordinarily retortion is taken in consequence of a legis-
lative, administrative, or judicial act of another state which al-
though legal under international law is nevertheless objectionable
or injurious. In practice states have had recourse to retortion
principally in cases of unfair treatment of their nationals, the ap-
plication to their nationals of discriminatory passport regulations
and fiscal duties, a denial of entry to their ships or goods, the
severance of diplomatic relations, and other acts which affront
the dignity of a state.
As the act which provoked retortion is a legal one, the act
of retortion must also be one which is lawful under international
law. Thus, the repudiation of a treaty obligation would not be a
legitimate act of retortion and, not being so, would constitute a
40 Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 558-68. See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 42-88, for a complete discussion of the jurisdiction of the court, its composition, and
procedures.
41 See Colbert, Retaliation in International Law 1-3, 200, 203 (1948).
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breach of law which is legally sanctionable under international
law.42
Reprisals 43 are means whereby a state may seek, within the
limits prescribed by the United Nations Charter, to obtain justice
through self-help.44 Further limitations within the context of the
United Nations Charter upon the resort to reprisals include the
prohibition of their use in the absence of some attempt to obtain
an amicable settlement of the delinquency in issue; their termi-
nation when reparations have been made; the prohibition of re-
prisals which are out of proportion to the act prompting them;
and the prohibition of reprisals against reprisals. 45 Reprisal is a
means by which states obtain satisfaction for breaches of interna-
tional law which they do not consider important enough for a
declaration of war but which require some remedial action. In the
past recourse to acts of reprisal was often abused. Reprisals were
usually imposed only on weaker states which were physically in-
capable of taking effective countermeasures. Today, only those re-
prisal measures which are of a non-forcible nature and which
involve no threat to use force in the absence of satisfaction, may
legally be imposed.4 Thus all measures involving the use of force
or the threat to use force, once permissible under customary inter-
national law as reprisal measures, have now been outlawed by con-
ventions of universal or general applicability.47
42 Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 589-90; 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at
134-35; Starke, An Introduction to International Law 342 (4th ed. 1958).
43 All of the important modern texts on international law continue, incorrectly, to
define reprisals as they did before the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the U.N.
Charter, as any kind of forcible or coercive measure whereby one state seeks to exer-
cise a deterrent effect or to obtain redress or satisfaction, directly or indirectly, for the
consequences of the illegal acts of another state, which has refused to make amends
for such conduct. See Briggs, The Law of Nations 958 (2d ed. 1952) ; Gould, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 590; 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 136, 143-44; Starke, op.
cit. supra note 42, at 342-43.
44 Gould, op. cit. supra note 18, at 593; 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at
143-44.
45 See The Venezuelan Preferential Case (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v. Vene-
zuela), in Scott, Hague Court Reports 55 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1904) ; The Naulilaa Case
(Portugal v. Germany), Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases
1927-1928, Case No. 360.
46 See Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 281, 431
(1963); McDougal & Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 142-43
(1961) ; 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 144; Starke op. cit. supra note 42, at
344; Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 286 (1954); Kuntz, "Sanctions
in International Law," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 324, 333-34 (1960).
4 7 Wright, "Subversive Intervention," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 529 (1960). Cf. Colbert,
op. cit. supra note 41, at 200-06.
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* Under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,48 which is still in full
force and effect, the signatories undertook that the "settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of what-
ever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never
be sought except by specific means." 49 This pre-World War II
limitation on extra-legal coercive action has been confirmed by the
Charter of the United Nations. 0
The Preamble of the Charter declares that one of its purposes
is "to insure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution
of methods that armed force shall not be used save in the common
interest." Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Charter, which gives
effect to its principles, obliges the members of the United Nations
to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered." Under this provision the use of forcible or coer-
cive measures is restricted to circumstances which do not constitute
an "international dispute" and, in the absence of such a dispute,
to measures of a peaceful nature.
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter further restricts the
scope of measures available in the settlement of international dis-
putes in that it provides, more specifically, that "all members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or the political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations."
As observed by Oppenheim the "comprehensiveness of these
provisions can hardly be surpassed." 5 1 The prohibition under Ar-
ticle 2 of the Charter thus extends both to the use of force and
to the threat to use force. The word "force" in the context of Ar-
ticle 2 of the Charter means armed force. It does not encompass
economic or political measures. The prohibition of recourse to armed
force, or the threat to use armed force, in the settlement of inter-
national disputes is tightened and reaffirmed by other provisions
of the Charter: Article 33 obliges the parties to any dispute likely
to endanger peace and security to seek a solution by specified peace-
ful procedures, and Article 39 vests in the Security Council juris-
diction, insofar as the application of enforcement action is con-
cerned, over any threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or
48 Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
49 The Treaty of Rio de Janiero of 1933, which binds the American States, pro-
rides thaf the ettlement of disputes shall be effected solely by pacific means per-
inissible under international lay/. See'Stone, op. cit. supra.note 46, at 286.
5oJune 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.'
512 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 153; Stone, op. cit. supra note 46, at
286-87.
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act of aggression.52 Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution,5 a
de facto revision of the Charter, the General Assembly assumed
the authority to urge the employment of collective measures to
insure the peace whenever the veto procedure in the Security Coun-
cil paralyzed that body. In paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter
the obligation of the members of the United Nations -not to resort
to force or the threat to use force is not limited by the words "against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." In
any event it would appear that "territorial integrity" coupled with
"political independence" is for all practical purposes synonymous
with territorial inviolability, and a state would be in breach of
its Charter obligation if it were to invade or commit an act of force
within the territory of another state, in anticipation of an alleged
impending attack, or to obtain redress without the intention of
interfering permanently with the territorial integrity of another
state.64 The prohibitions of the Charter are all-inclusive except for
the use of force when directed by the Security Council, or when
recommended by the General Assembly for the purposes of the
Charter, or in self-defense consistent with the provisions of Article
51 of the Charter. As to self-defense, Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by members in excess of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and respon-
sibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
Thus, although the Charter enlarges the right of self-defense
by authorizing both individual and collective defense (a member
being permitted to have recourse to action in self-defense when
2 Stone, op. cit. supra note 46, at 287.
5 U.N. Gen. Ass, Off. Rec. 5th Sess., Plenary 302 (A/1481) (1950). See Sohn,
Cases on United Nations Law 229-46 (1956).
54 See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 154. In 1948 the United States and
other American States assumed an obligation to limit the use of forcible or coercive
procedures even broader than that contained in the U.N. Charter. Article I provides:
"The High Contracting Parties, solemnly affiiming their commitments made in earlier
international, conventions and declarations, as well as. in the Charter of the United
Nations, agree to refrain from the threat or the use of. force, or from any other means
of coercion for the settlement of their controversies, and to have recourse at-all.times
to pacific- procedures" See Falk, tJanus Tormented: The International -Law of In-
ternal War," in International Aspects of Civil Strife n. 187 (RosenatL ed- L964) ..
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it or any other state whose safety is deemed vital to its own safety
and independence is the object of an armed attack), it also con-
fines the right of armed self-defense to instances of armed attack.
It thus negates recourse by states to the use of armed force in
anticipation of an armed attack or to the use of force which
falls short of armed attack. However unfortunate this restriction
may be in periods of sweeping technological advances in weaponry
which preclude the taking of practical measures to insure adequate
advance warning of an armed attack, it would appear that recourse
to anticipatory armed attack for defense purposes is now legally
impermissible.
This deficiency could only be legally rectified by an appropri-
ate amendment to the Charter, there being no legislative authority
capable of filling this serious security gap.55 It is the opinion of
some legal publicists, however, that paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the
United Nations Charter does not deny states the right to enforce
their international rights by a resort to force or the threat to use
force when the enjoyment of their fundamental international rights
is legally denied and when the collective measures contemplated by
the Charter are rendered inoperative or are frustrated. Under such
circumstances, they argue, the sanctions of customary international
law are revived and may be resorted to legally. This conclusion is
predicated on the fact that the Charter is particular international
law which is based on general international law. The principles
and norms of the latter are revived and replace treaty norms
that are no longer operative.56 Other legal publicists contend that
since the Charter refers to the right of self-defense as an "inherent
right" it can still be applied where it is permitted under general
international law, not only against actual attack but also against
a threatened aggression when the danger is imminent.57 These
views to date have not received any general support. As a practical
matter it is to be anticipated that states will continue to view
self-defense as a matter which is proper for determination on
political, not legal, grounds. As such it is unlikely that states
will forego the use of force or the threat to use force for purposes
of self-defense against action which is not in the nature of an armed
attack.
55 See Kuntz, supra note 46, at 327, 341, 345.
56 Stone, Aggression and World Order (1958) ; Waldock, "The Regulation of the
Use of Force by Individual States in International Law," 81 Recueil des Cours (II)
455 (1952). See also The Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 5; cf.
Kuntz, supra note 46, at 345.
-5 Colbert, op. cit. supra note 41, at 200; Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention:
The Law and Its Import in the Americas 123, 307 (1956).
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The right to use force in self-defense is authorized only for
so long as the Security Council has not taken the steps necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. The au-
thority to use armed forces in self-defense in cases of armed attack
is in itself an exceptional authorization which is dictated by the
requirement for the unanimity of the permanent members of the
Security Council before U.N. action can be undertaken to preserve
or maintain international peace and security. This restrictive pro-
vision makes it difficult and, in some cases, impossible, for the Se-
curity Council to fulfill its primary function. It is this situation
which motivated the member states to conclude multilateral treaties
for collective defense. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949;1s the
Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Col-
lective Self-Defence of 1948;1" the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance, signed September 2, 1947,60 in Rio de Janeiro;
and the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed
at Bogota on April 30, 1948,61 were all concluded for the purpose of
affirming and giving effectiveness to the right of collective defense.
The more important types of reprisals are pacific blockade,
embargo, and boycotts-financial or economic.
Pacific blockade is a measure employed to cut off ingress to
and egress from a state by naval operations and to compel the
state so isolated to yield to demands-to grant redress for an illegal
act. This is to be deemed pacific only in the sense that the block-
ading state is disposed to remain at peace while the blockaded state
does not elect to treat the operation as producing war or as com-
pelling it to declare or wage war. According to the rules of pacific
blockade, the blockading state may detain or sequester ships of
the blockaded state only. Theoretically, as there is no war, no
search or visit may legally be undertaken of ships of third coun-
tries which enter or depart the ports of the blockaded state. A
blockading state, however, has the right to identify ships which
attempt to pass the blockade. In a belligerent blockade belligerent
states have the right to cut off access by sea to enemy-controlled
locations and the blockading states may seize as contraband arti-
cles destined for the enemy and may confiscate all vessels bound
for enemy ports with contraband goods. 2
us April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
59 Cmd. No. 7367 (1948). Great Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands were parties to the treaty.
60 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 79.
61 [1951] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
152See Hindmarsh, Force in Peace (1933) ; Hogan, Pacific Blockade (1908).
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-In a memorandum on pacific blockades prepared for the
League of Nations in 1928,83 Giraud, a member of the Secretar-
iat, concluded that all of the great European powers had resorted
to pacific blockades on numerous occasions; that no great non-
European power had ever resorted to pacific blockades; that "paci-
fic blockades have practically never been instituted except by pow-
erful states against weaker ones (small states possessing no powerful
fleet)"; that pacific blockades had been instituted by individual
states to obtain reparations for alleged wrongs or "by the Great
Powers acting in concert to put an end to some disturbance, pre-
vent the -outbreak of war, insure the- execution of general treaties,
or safeguard the interests -of humanity."
The United States has consistently opposed the application of
pacific blockades to- American vessels and has denied the legiti-
macy of such action. 4 All cases of pacific blockades are either cases
of intervention or of reprisal,65 and both are illegal under paragraphs
3 and 4 of Article 2 and Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations unless resorted to unilaterally or collectively as an en-
forcement action under Article 4-2 of the Charter.6
The Cuban quarantine, as it was applied, was a cross. be-
tween a peaceful and. a belligerent blockade. It differed from a
peaceful blockade in that it was directed not only against the ships
of the blockaded state but as well against those of non-blockaded
nations. It has been- stated by some commentators that the block-
ade was imposed in redress of an illegal act-aggression-and in
self-defense. It differed from a belligerent blockade in that it was
not intended that the goods or the ships of third parties would
be confiscated. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the
legal pros and cons of the Cuban quarantine, a subject to which
much scholarly attention has already been devoted. There is au-
thority to substantiate both views on the legality of the quarantine
as imposed by the United States.6 What is more. important than
the legality of this action, however, is the very dangerous prece-
6a Doc. A 14, V. 14, p. 89 (1927).
64 See Briggs, op. cit. mipra note 43, at 959; Rowson, "Modern Blockade: Some
Legal Aspects," 23 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 346-53 (1946).
5 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 17, at 145, 149, 159-66, 196-97.
66 See Starke, op. cit. supra note 42, at 86-88.
67 It can be argued in support of the quarantine that Article 8 of the Rio Pact,
which provides for the complete interruption of sea communications, recognizes and
authorizes measures of this sort, and that such action is compatible with and is an-
&torizel by'Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, which leaves to regional ar-
rangements or agencies the responsibility for the maintenance of internationil peace
and security in such instances as are appropriate for regional acti6n. Spme have argued,
on the other hand, that the'Rid Pact authorizes only peaceful non'-intercourse with an
offending state, not a bloclade which is incompatible with the U.N. Charter,'th pro-
visions of which are binding on international arrangements and agencies. Those who
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dent which it may have established in the field of- anticipatory
self-defense.
In its technical sense an embargo is a form of reprisal consist-
ing of the forcible detention of the ships of states which are al-
leged to have committed a breach of international law, in order to
compel reparation for the wrong done. Today, selective embargoes,
as distinguished from total embargoes under which states individ-
ually or collectively refused either to sell or purchase from an-
other state, have become a common measure. This measure has
generally been adopted not only as a reprisal undertaken by an
injured state but also to preclude an aggressor state from increasing
its war-making potential, to prevent the aggravation of civil strife
in a state in which domestic violence exists, to comply with a state's
international duty as a neutral in time of war, or to deny to belli-
gerents implements or materials of war.6 Embargoes now may be
employed by states individually or collectively as reprisals or as
collective enforcement actions under Articles 39 and 42 of the
Charter of the U.N. to reduce an alleged aggressor's capability to
undertake or to continue its belligerent activities.6 9
espouse this position assert that if the Rio Pact intended to the contrary, it is in-
compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations, for a quarantine
constitutes a use of force or a threat to use force which is contrary to the provisions
of Articles 2 and 33 of the U.N. Charter which permits states to take action of this
nature only to repel an armed attack. Others have supported the Cuban quarantine
as an exercise of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
See Christol & Davis, "Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offens-
ive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962," 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 525 (1963) ;
Claude, "The OAS, the UN, and the United States," 547 Int'l Conc. 63 (March
1964) ; Henkin, "Force, Intervention, and Neutrality In Contemporary -International
Law," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 147-63, 165-73
(1963); Mallison, "Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National
and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law," 31 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 335 (1962); Meeker, "Defensive Quarantine and the Law," 57 Am. J. Int'l L.
515 (1963); Oliver, "International Law and Quarantine of Cuba: A Hopeful Pre-
scription for Legal Writing," 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 373 (1963) ; Seligman, "The Legality
of U.S. Quarantine Action Under the United Nations Charter," 49 A.B.A.J. 142
(1963) ; Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law 9-10 (1963) ; Wright, "The Cuba Quarantine," 57 Am. J. Int'l L.
546 (1963). During the 1963 Proceedings'of the American Society of Internrtional
Law, Milton Katz, Harvard Law School (at 162-63, 169, 170), Louis Henkin, Columbia
Law School (at 147-73), L. B. Sohn, Harvard Law School (at 171, 208), and
Quincy Wright, Columbia Law School (at 9-10, 16-17, 171) questioned the legality
of the Cuban quarantine. During the same proceedings, Myres S. McDougal, Yale Law
School (at 162-69, 170-71), Abram Chayes, Legal Advisor, Department of State (at
10-13), and W. T. Mallison, George Washington Law School (at 170) considered the
quarantine as an action compatible in all respects with international law.
8 See 2 Oppenheim, International Law 141-42 -(7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952); Stone
op. cit. supra note 46, at 291.
09 Gould, An Introduction 'to International Law 594- (1957) ; Stone, op. cft. -iupra
note 46, at 291. . . .. - ..
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Embargoes in the past have usually been of a selective nature:
on arms, ammunition, and materials essential for the production of
arms, or on oil and other products which are necessary for the
conduct of hostilities. At the present time Communist China is
under a total embargo imposed by the United States. During the
Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935-36 the League of Nations imposed
a partial embargo upon Italy without success. 70 Arms embargoes
were also employed by the League of Nations in the Chaco dispute,
by the U.N. in the Palestine crisis of 1948, and unilaterally by
states in numerous instances. In the 1930's the United States im-
posed arms embargoes on some Latin American countries.
Financial boycott is a severance of financial relationships by
states individually or collectively. It is designed to cut off supplies
to another state by making it difficult or impossible for that state
to purchase essential goods abroad after its own foreign exchange
and gold have been exhausted. 71 A financial boycott includes the
withholding of loans and credits, suspension of balances due, block-
ing of loans and credits, blocking and freezing of gold and other
assets, forbidding the remittance of funds, and the sequestration
of the property of the nationals of the state subject to the boy-
cott. Financial measures such as these, together with full economic
embargoes and other measures, are utilized particularly in time of
war.
The international boycott is a modern form of reprisal whereby
states, individually or collectively, completely interrupt all rela-
tionships with another state and its nationals.72 Such a sanction
was prescribed by Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of
Nations for application to a state which "resorts to war in disregard
of certain other provisions of the Covenant." By this Article all
member states undertook "immediately to subject it to the sever-
ance of all trade and financial relations, the prohibition of all in-
tercourse between their nationals, and the nationals of the covenant-
breaking state, and the nationals of any other state, whether a
member of the League or not." Presumably the sanction was not
to cease upon the mere cessation of hostilities, but was to be con-
tinued until all illegal gain had been surrendered.
Some question exists as to the legality of a boycott which is
directed against a state which has not committed an illegal act.
Some authorities are of the opinion that under certain circum-
stances it could amount to an act of economic aggression which
should be prohibited by law. 73
70 Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Sanctions 1 (1938).
7lId. at 76.
72 Id. at 107; see Stone, op. cit. supra note 46, at 291.
'8 See Gould, op. cit. supra note 69, at 594; Stone, op. cit. supra note 46, at 291.
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B. Responses Available to Regional Arrangements and Agencies.
Regional arrangements have been defined as "groupings of
States established by treaty on the basis of geographical propin-
quity, provided with common organs, and aiming at cooperation
and mutual assistance, in particular, in the political sphere." 74
The Organization of American States (OAS)75 constitutes
such a regional arrangement. It is debatable, however, whether
treaties of collective defense such as the Treaty of Brussels of March
17, 1948, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, created
regional arrangements within the meaning of the Charter, in that
they are essentially treaties of collective defense and they neither
require nor provide means for the peaceful settlement of disputes
between their member states.76 Logically there appears to be no
reason why arrangements for defense purposes only should not, for
the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, be considered as regional
arrangements under Articles 52 through 54 of the Charter.77
The OAS was established by a series of instruments " which
state that it is a regional agency within the Charter's meaning.
Furthermore, one of the purposes of the OAS is to fulfill regional
obligations under the Charter of the U.N. which assigns to regional
arrangements and agencies certain responsibilities for the pacific
settlement of disputes and for the enforcement of the Charter.
Article 52 of the U.N. Charter specifies that nothing in the
Charter "precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agen-
cies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations." Article 33 of the Charter refers to regional
arrangements as a means for the peaceful settlement of disputes to
which members must first have recourse in the settlement of their
disputes. Additionally, Article 52 specifies that members partici-
pating in such arrangements shall make every effort to achieve
pacific settlement of local disputes through these bodies before
they are referred to the Security Council for resolution. Under
Article 53, the Security Council may, where appropriate, use re-
gional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its
authority. "Enforcement action" by such arrangements or agencies,
however, may only be undertaken with the Security Council's
74 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 117.7
; April 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
76 See 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 158-59; Stone, op. cit. supra note
46, at 247-51.
77 Stone, op. cit. supra note 46, at 251.
78 See note 82 infra.
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authority. Article 54 specifies that the Security Council must be
informed of all regional activities for the maintenance of peace
and security.
The responses and sanctions which are available to the mem-
bers of the OAS, individually or collectively, for the redress of
alleged breaches of the Charter of the OAS, of other conventional
arrangements to which they are parties, and of the rules and prin-
ciples of customary international law, are those which have been
discussed above.
The authority for individual and collective sanctions by mem-
bers of the OAS in the maintenance of peace and the territorial
integrity and political independence of the member states is de-
rived in particular from the U.N. Charter, 9 the Charter of the OAS,
and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty)." The legality of the particular response by a member
state, or by member states of the OAS to a breach of an interna-
tional obligation is, therefore, dependent upon its compatibility with
the provisions of these conventional arrangements.
The Charter of the OAS provides the constitutional framework
for the settlement of disputes between the parties in the OAS. It
establishes, as well, the collective responsibility of the member
states to maintain the peace and the territorial integrity and
political independence of the member states. It is the Rio Treaty,
however, in particular, which specifies the manner and the means
by which the objectives of the Charter of the OAS are to be at-
tained and insured.
1. Pacific Settlement of Disputes Under the Charter
of the OAS.
Under Article 1 of the Charter of the OAS the member states
are, under all circumstances, bound to refrain from intervening,
directly or indirectly, in the internal and external affairs of other
member states. The Charter, furthermore, precludes the "threat
or the use of force" and "other means of coercion for the settlement
of their controversies" and it obligates the member states "to have
recourse at all times to pacific procedures." 8I In this respect, the
Charter of the OAS binds the members to seek the settlement of
their disputes by direct negotiations, good offices, mediation, inves-
79 June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.80 Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.
8l The text of Article I places greater limitations on the use of forcible or co-
ercive action than does the Charter of the U.N. Its language can be taken to preclude
all recourse to non-pacific measures of a forcible or coercive character except perhaps
for the severence of diplomatic relations or recourse to mild forms of retortion, re-
prisals, embargo or boycott but only after pacific methods of settlement have been
attempted unsuccessfully. See Stone, op. cit. supra note 46, at 287.
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tigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and any
other pacific means which may have been agreed upon by the
parties concerned. 2
On the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Rio Treaty specifies
that the parties in their international relations are not to resort to
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with its pro-
visions or those of the Charter of the U.N. (Article 1); that
they will make every endeavor to settle any such controversy by
means of the procedures in force in the Inter-American System
before they refer it to the General Assembly or the Security
Council of the U.N. (Article 2); and that for the purpose of the
Treaty "the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may
agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs
of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking
of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic
relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and
radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications ... ." (Article
8). This article also authorizes the use of armed force in the
exercise of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article
51 of the Charter of the U.N.
2. Coercive and Forcible Measures by the OAS in the
Settlement of Disputes.
Articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty obligate individual and
collective action with respect to threats of aggression and armed
attacks.
Article 6 provides:
if the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American State should
be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by
82 See Charter of the OAS, supra note 75 (Articles 20 and 21). Treaties among
the American States which set forth the specific means by which disputes are to be
settled peacefully are: The Act of Chapultepec, March 8, 1945, 60 Stat. 1831, T.I.A.S.
No. 1543; Treaty on Coordination, Extension and Fulfillment of Existing Treaties
Between the American States, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 926; Treaty on
Good Offices and Mediation, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 90, T.S. No. 925; Treaty on Pre-
vention of Controversies, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 65, T.S. No. 924; Treaty on Non-
Intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41, T.S. No. 923; Treaty on Maintenance, Preser-
vation, and Reestablishment of Peace, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 15, T.S. No. 922;
Treaty on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881;
Anti-War, Nonaggression and Conciliation Treaty, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363, T.S.
No. 906; Treaty on Inter-American Arbitration, Jan. 5, 1929, 49 Stat. 3153, T.S. No.
886; Treaty on Inter-American Conciliation, Jan. 5, 1929, 46 Stat. 2209, T.S. No. 780;
Treaty on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, 46
Stat. 2749, T.S. No. 814; Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between the Ameri-
can States, May 3, 1923, 44 Stat. 2527, T.S. No. 752; Treaty on Establishment of
International Commission of Inquiry, Feb. 7, 1923, 44 Stat. 2070, T.S. No. 717.
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an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other
fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree
on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to
assist the victim of the aggression, or in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and for the main-
tenance of the peace and security of the Continent.
Article 3 provides:
1, The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by
any State against an American State shall be considered as an
attack against all the American States and, consequently, each
one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meet-
ing the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations....
3, The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any
armed attack which takes place within the region described in
Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the
attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of
Article 6 shall be applied.
4, Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may
be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.
The Rio Treaty further provides in Article 7 that:
In the case of a conflict between two or more American States,
without prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High Con-
tracting Parties, meeting in consultation shall call upon the con-
tending States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the
status quo ante bellum, and shall take in addition all other neces-
sary measures to reestablish or maintain inter-American peace
and security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful
means. The rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in
the determination of the aggressor and in the application of the
measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon.
The OAS has, in most instances where the provisions of the
Rio Treaty were applicable, sought a solution through other than
forcible measures. Since 1947, there have been some ten cases in
which the OAS, through its Organ of Consultation or its provisional
Organ of Consultation-the council of the OAS-has taken or has
considered taking collective action to enforce the obligations as-
sumed by the member states under the Charter of the OAS and
the Rio Treaty. In all but three cases, peaceful action only was
taken to rectify breaches of international law and to restore the
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peace. The peaceful action taken in these instances was of a con-
ciliatory nature, consisting either of the appointment of fact-finding
committees or committees of inquiry, the appointment of observa-
tion or surveillance committees to ascertain whether the recom-
mendations of the provisional Organ of Consultation of the OAS
were being carried out, or the imposition of admonitions or censure.
In the three remaining cases the action taken was coercive and
forcible in nature. In one-the Venezuelan-Dominican Republic
dispute of 1960-the OAS resolved to rupture diplomatic relations
with the Dominican Republic and, as well, partially to interrupt
economic relations with it. In the second-the Cuban political
situation in 1962-the OAS suspended Cuba from participation in
the inter-American system and suspended all trade in arms and
implements of war with Cuba. In the third-the Cuban missile
crisis-it authorized the taking of all measures, individual or col-
lective, including armed force, to insure that Cuba would not con-
tinue to receive from the Soviet bloc military materials which
could threaten the peace and security of the continent.
The Rio Treaty specifies in Article 5 that the members shall,
in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United
Nations, "immediately send to the Security Council of the United
Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken
or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or
for the purposes of maintaining inter-American peace and security."
And Article 10 provides that none of the provisions of the Treaty
are to be "construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the
High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations."
In the light of the foregoing it would appear that the Charter
contemplated that action taken by the OAS and other regional
arrangements and agencies for the purpose of maintaining inter-
national peace and security would be consistent with the overall
purposes and the principles of the U.N. Charter. Thus, assuming
that the Security Council can act effectively, it is the Security
Council and not the OAS which is to bear the primary responsibility
for insuring the peace. Therefore, it is for the Security Council, not
the regional arrangement or agency which is exercising the right of
self-defense, to decide whether measures necessary and sufficient
for the maintenance of peace and security have been taken. Further-
more, the determination whether regional action allegedly taken
in self-defense was justifiable under the circumstances is one which
rests solely with the Security Council."3 Under this view states
83 The constitutionality of regional arrangements for collective self-defense depends
on their conformity with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See Falk, op. cit. supra note
54, at 243; Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 918 (1950) ; Thomas & Thomas,
op. cit. supra note 57, at 160-86.
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operating under a regional arrangement do not have the right
under the Charter to determine the legality of actions taken by
them, allegedly in self-defense. They are considered to have only
the right to decide in the first instance whether they are the object
of an armed attack which requires armed resistance."4 This position
is premised upon the concept that the right of self-defense, if it is
not to become an excuse for lawlessness, must necessarily be the
subject of review and control by superior authority. The proponents
of this view assert-properly, it is believed-that Article 51 of the
Charter vests in the Security Council such a superior authority.
Although the purposes and objectives which were originally
visualized by the U.N. Charter may not have been attained-in
part because of the voting requirements in the Security Council-
the principles and purposes of the Charter have nevertheless been
infused into the regional and self-defense arrangements which it
authorized and fostered.
In this respect Claude has observed that, although the OAS
has been able to establish a monopolistic jurisdiction over disputes
in its region, the Security Council itself has never attained the
capacity to regulate or control the enforcement operations of the
OAS. Members of regional agencies have an interest in evading
control by the Security Council and it is highly improbable that the
Council will be able in the foreseeable future to exercise any effective
superior authority over regional agencies. In fact it is obvious that
in an era of cold war, regional organizations provide the great
powers with an important political weapon. They will not permit
this weapon to be checkmated by the United Nations.8 5
C. Responses Whick Are Available to the United Nations.
The manner in which states are required to settle their disputes
and the limited extent to which they are authorized to have recourse
to armed force under the U.N. Charter has been discussed in some
detail. The discussion which follows, therefore, will consider the
variety of measures and procedures which are available to the U.N.
under the Charter in the peaceful or forcible settlement of disputes
which endanger the international peace and security. The vast
potential of the U.N. for these purposes has not been fully recog-
nized, much less realized. To date very little ingenuity has been
displayed in developing or fostering the latent capabilities of the
U.N. for effective preventive action in the settlement of inter-
national disputes.
84 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 159.
85 Claude, "The OAS, the UN and the United States," 547 Int'l Conc. 63 (March
1964).
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1. Pacific Settlement of Disputes.
Article 33 of the Charter requires that "the parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra-
tion, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their own choice." Should these measures
prove ineffectual, Article 37 binds the parties to refer the dispute
to the Security Council. The parties to an international dispute
may bring a dispute or any situation which might lead to interna-
tional friction or give rise to a dispute to the attention of either
the Security Council or the General Assembly. A non-member
state has the same right, if it accepts in advance for the purpose of
the dispute the obligation of pacific settlement specified in the
Charter. The proceedings of the General Assembly on matters of
this nature which have been brought to its attention, however, are
subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter.
a. The Security Council.
The Security Council is empowered under Article 43 to inves-
tigate "any dispute or any situation which might lead to interna-
tional friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether
the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security." Should the
investigation disclose that the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the international peace and security, the Security Council
may then have recourse to the measures specified in Articles 33 and
36 through 43 of the Charter.
The Security Council may, under Article 36, "at any stage of a
dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of
like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of
adjustment" taking into "consideration any procedures for the
settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the
parties." In making recommendations under this article, the Secur-
ity Council is to "take into consideration that legal disputes should
as a general rule be referred ... to the International Court of Jus-
tice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."
As to disputes of the nature mentioned in Article 33, which the
parties have been unable to settle by the peaceful means specified
in that article, the Security Council must "decide whether to take
action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement
as it may consider appropriate."
Under Article 38, the Security Council may also, upon the
request of the disputing parties, make recommendations with a
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view to pacific settlement of their dispute. Under Articles 39, 41,
and 42, the Security Council may have recourse to the coercive and
forcible measures which are authorized by Articles 41 and 42 of
the Charter.
In addition to its authorization under Articles 33-38 of the
Charter for the settlement of disputes, the Security Council has
available to it as well, the broad powers specified in Article 24 of
the Charter. This article provides:
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN,
its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Secur-
ity Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Na-
tions. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the
discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII,
VIII, and XII.
b. The General Assembly.
The General Assembly is also authorized (by Article 10) to
discuss "any question or any matter within the scope of the Charter
or relating to the powers and functions of any organ provided for
in the... Charter, and except as provided in Article 12, may make
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the
Security Council or to both." Under Article 11, "any such question
on which action is necessary may be referred to the Security Coun-
cil by the General Assembly either before or after discussion."
Article 11 also provides that the General Assembly may "call the
attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to
endanger international peace and security."
Article 12 limits the authority granted to the General Assem-
bly by Articles 10 and 11. It specifies that the General Assembly
shall make no recommendations on any dispute or situation which
is likely to endanger international peace and security while the
Security Council is exercising the primary functions which are
assigned to it by the Charter with respect to such dispute or situ-
ation unless the Council so requests.
Under the authority contained in Articles 10 and 11 of the
Charter, the General Assembly in 1950 adopted the Uniting for
Peace Resolution 81 which, in part, rectifies the impotency of the
U.N. which results from the unanimity which the Charter requires
in the voting of the permanent members of the Security Council
8sSupra note 53.
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on matters pertaining to the maintenance and enforcement of inter-
national peace and security. The Uniting for Peace Resolution
provides, that
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the perma-
nent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibilities for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where
there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with the view of making appropriate recommenda-
tions to Members for collective measures, including in the case
of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression, the use of armed
force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace
and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly
may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours
of the request therefor. Such emergency special session may be
called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any
seven members, or by a majority of the members of the United
Nations.
In the same resolution, the General Assembly established a Peace
Observation Commission and a Collective Measures Committee
to study and report on methods to maintain and strengthen inter-
national peace and security, taking account of collective self-
defense and regional arrangements under Articles 51 and 52. The
Resolution was directed to cases in which the Security Council had
failed to deal effectively with a situation or dispute and in which,
therefore, that body could no longer be deemed to be exercising its
primary functions with respect to them under Article 12 of the
U.N. Charter. This Resolution, which provides only for recommen-
dations which are not binding on the members, is compatible with
the objective of the Charter: the enforcement of peace. As such, the
Resolution and the recommendations made under it are actions
which the General Assembly may properly take under the Charter
of the U.N.
Although the General Assembly plays an important role in the
settlement of disputes under the U.N. Charter, it is nevertheless
the Security Council which has the dominant role and is the prin-
cipal agency of the U.N. in the settlement of disputes.
c. The Autthority of the Security Council.
(1) Investigation.
As noted above, the Security Council under Article 34 may
of its own accord investigate and discuss any dispute or situation
to determine whether its continuation is likely to endanger inter-
national peace and security. The power of the Security Council to
investigate disputes and situations may be utilized to make recom-
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mendations under Article 36 and to determine the existence of
situations calling for enforcement action under the Charter or
under Article 33 (2) which specifies that the Security Council shall,
when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute
by one of the means specified in that article or under Article 37
after the parties have failed to settle their dispute by one of the
means enumerated in the Charter. The Security Council may exer-
cise its investigation authority at any stage of a dispute-before
the parties have attempted a method or methods of settlement
specified in Article 33, or even before a dispute has arisen.
The Security Council on numerous occasions has appointed
commissions of inquiry and investigation. A Security Council Com-
mission under Article 34 was established in 1946 to ascertain the
facts of an alleged violation of the frontier between Greece, Albania,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.87
The Peace Observation Commission (POC) which was pro-
posed by the United States and established under the 1950 Uniting
for Peace Resolution was designed, as noted above, to "observe
and report on the situation in any area where there exists inter-
national tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security." Recourse to
the vast potential of a POC in the maintenance of peace has to
date been only minimal. In fact the POC has been resorted to only
once, at the suggestion of Greece, when it undertook to observe the
frontiers between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as the
successor to the Special Security Council Committee on the Balkans
which had been established in 1946 to ascertain the facts of alleged
border violations. In other instances in which recourse to a POC
was requested or might have proved profitable, its use was either
vetoed or discouraged. In 1954 when Thailand brought the Indo-
chinese situation to the attention of the Security Council, it re-
quested the establishment of a POC subcommittee and the presence
of observers in the area. This proposal was vetoed by the Soviet
Union."8 The United States discouraged the use of a POC in Burma
in 1954, with respect to the alleged improper activities of Chinese
Nationalist elements on Burma's northern frontiers. Since that
time, no serious efforts have been made to utilize the services
of the POC. 9
The POC provides a versatile mechanism which the U.N.
could utilize to exercise an effective and restraining influence on
87 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 104-05.
88 Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy 147 (1960).
8 9Id. at 148.
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disputants in areas where there exist international tensions "likely
to endanger the maintenance of . . . peace and security" and
through which the U.N. could receive unbiased reports, based on
observation, as to the illegal and belligerent activities of the dis-
putants. The Korean conflict clearly reflected the potential of a POC
in these respects. The report of the U.N. Commission for Korea at
the commencement of the conflict in 1950 left no doubt that the
attack had been commenced by the North Koreans, because this
Committee, present in Korea to use its good offices to effectuate
the unification of Korea, was on the scene at the time of the attack.
Its report, submitted in the name of a neutral, the Indian chairman,
fully established the authenticity of the United States' charge that
the North Koreans had launched an armed attack.
(2) Good Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation.
The Security Council, under Article 24, may assume concilia-
tory or mediation functions in disputes. It may undertake such
action itself or through individuals or commissions appointed by it.
In 1947, it appointed a Committee of Good Offices to assist in
resolving a dispute in Indonesia. In 1948 it appointed first a me-
diator and then a Commission of Conciliation to assist in resolving
the Palestine dispute. Again in 1948, it established a Commission
of Investigation and Mediation to resolve the Kashmir dispute
between India and Pakistan. These instances and the action of the
U.N. in Lebanon and the Suez indicate that a U.N. presence in
disputes, either through good offices, mediation, consultation, inves-
tigation, and inquiry, or by means of a cease-fire and the presence
of a U.N. military force, permits a U.N. takeover of the dispute
and application thereto of the U.N. Charter rules for the peaceful
settlement of controversies. More important, it makes the inter-
vention by the great powers in disputes difficult, if not impossibleY0
The application by the U.N. of deterrent measures not involving
the use of armed force in disputes between the lesser powers has
generally been successful in insulating the disputants from the
political influences and objectives of the great powers, particularly
when contingents of non-fighting U.N. troops have been dispatched
to areas where contention or conflict existed-for example, the
Sinai peninsula, the Gaza strip, Lebanon, and the Congo. The
importance of a U.N. presence in crises which could involve the
great powers was forcefully demonstrated during the Suez contro-
versy by the presence of a non-fighting U.N. force which contained
no military units of the great powers, the presence of the U.N.
90 Id. at 67.
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Truce Supervisory Organization, and the activities of the U.N.
Secretary General."
(3) Recommendations on Terms of Settlement.
Under Article 36, the Security Council may recommend pro-
cedures or methods for the settlement of disputes at any stage or
in any situation which is likely to endanger international peace,
whether the dispute is brought before it by the parties under
Article 33 or 35. Furthermore, the parties to a dispute are bound
to submit it to the Security Council if they have failed to settle it
under Article 37. In this event, the Security Council must decide
whether to recommend procedures of settlement or terms of settle-
ment. Until the Security Council sees fit to decree compulsive
measures in the settlement of disputes under Chapter VII of the
Charter, its pronouncement on the settlement of disputes, either
procedural or substantive, have only moral and political effective-
ness. The Security Council, by resolution of December 24, 1948,
called upon the governments of Holland and Indonesia to cease
hostilities, and upon Holland to release the Indonesian President
and political prisoners. In a resolution of January 28, 1949, it called
upon the Dutch government to discontinue its military operations
and to release all political prisoners immediately. In another resolu-
tion it called upon Indonesia to desist from guerilla warfare. Neither
the Security Council nor the General Assembly has the power,
under the Charter, to direct that these disputants adopt or desist
from a line of conduct in the peaceful settlement of their dispute
in the absence of "enforcement" action under Chapter VII of the
Charter.92
(4) The Imposition and Enforcement of Measures Taken.
The power of the Security Council to have recourse to meas-
ures of compulsion (Article 39) is dependent upon a prior deter-
mination by the Council that there exists a "threat to the peace, or
act of aggression." Under this article the Security Council may
simultaneously have recourse to both conciliatory and enforcement
action. An important instance of recourse to Article 39 was the
Security Council declaration after the invasion of South Korea in
1950 13 that the action of North Korea constituted a breach of the
peace; its call upon North Korea to "cease hostilities forthwith"
and to withdraw its troops to the frontier; and its call upon the
U.N. members to render every assistance in the execution of that
Resolution. When North Korea failed to comply with this Resolu-
91 Id. at 44, 47.
92 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 108-09.
9 3 Resolution of June 25, 1950 (Doc. S/1501).
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tion, the Security Council issued another 14 which recommended
that the members of the U.N. "furnish such assistance to the Re-
public of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and
to restore international peace and security." Although the Security
Council could have directed this action rather than recommending
it, by recommending this action the Council made it possible for the
members of the U.N. to indicate their uniform support of the
Security Council.
Enforcement action under the Charter may be taken against
both member and non-member states. Article 39 refers to any
threat to the peace, and important enforcement action thereunder
has been taken against non-member states, e.g., the dispute between
Holland and Indonesia in 1947; the United Kingdom-Palestine
dispute in 1948; and the Korean actionY5
Under Article 40 of the Charter, the Security Council is also
empowered to call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as "it deems necessary or desirable" before it
makes any recommendations or orders measures of enforcement.
The Council, it will be remembered, took provisional measures in
the Palestine dispute."
At the present time, when collective security cannot be fully
insured through U.N. military action and the great powers are
each capable of massive and devastating retaliation even after a
first strike by another power, the political, rather than the military,
role of the U.N. provides the means by which world peace and the
peaceful settlement of disputes can be insured. 7 It is this aspect
of the U.N., therefore, which must be emphasized and made more
effective.
d. The Authority of the General Assembly.
The General Assembly has wider latitude with respect to the
settlement of disputes than has the Security Council. Its juris-
diction over disputes or situations which might lead to friction or
disputes is co-extensive with that of the Security Council, except
that it may not make any recommendations to the members on
these matters while the Security Council is exercising its primary
functions with respect to them.
Under Article 11(2) the General Assembly may discuss any
question relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security which is brought before it and, subject to the limitation
94 Resolution of June 27, 1950 (Doc. S/1511).
95 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, it 164-65.
96 Id. at 166-67.
97 Bloomfield, op. cit. supra note 88, at 46.
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contained in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard
to such question either to the states concerned or to the Security
Council. Under Article 10 the General Assembly may discuss any
question or matter within the scope of the Charter, subject again,
however, to the limitation contained in Article 12. As to all of these
matters, the General Assembly may conduct investigations and it
may set up temporary or permanent bodies for this purpose. The
General Assembly's authority flows from its power to discuss and
make recommendations on questions, disputes, and situations which
might lead to international friction or give rise to disputes. The
General Assembly, like the Security Council, may, when acting
under Article 35, make recommendations as to both the method
and the terms of settlement. The important cases on which the
General Assembly has made fruitful recommendations include the
question of the independence of Korea, the threats to the political
independence and the territorial integrity of Greece, and the dispute
between India and South Africa concerning the treatment of Indians
in South Africa.98
2. Coercive and Forcible Measures by the U.N.
The Charter of the U.N. provides for two coercive means of
settling international disputes and situations which constitute a
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
One provides for coercive measures not involving the use of armed
force, the other for the use of armed force.
Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42 provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.
98 2 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 111.
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In implementation of this article, Article 43 provides that
the Members of the United Nations, are to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of main-
taining international peace and security ....
Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and
types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and
the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be
concluded between the Security Council and Members or between
the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject
to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
To date, political difficulties have precluded the conclusion of
the agreements envisaged by Article 43. This situation, however,
was anticipated, for Article 106 of the Charter provides that pend-
ing the coming into force of the special agreements contemplated
by Article 43, the five permanent members of the Security Council
shall consult with one another and with other members of the U.N.
with a view to such joint action on behalf of the U.N. as may be
deemed necessary by the Security Council for it to begin the exer-
cise of its responsibility under Article 42, for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The conclusion of special agree-
ments by all members of the U.N. is not, therefore, an essential
condition precedent for the assumption by the Security Council of
responsibilities under Article 42. As a practical matter, however,
conclusion of some such agreements is necessary for that purpose.9
Although Articles 42 and 43 create the possibility of an inde-
pendent international armed force under the direction of the Secur-
ity Council, such a system has not, and in all probability, will not,
be adopted in the foreseeable future. In lieu thereof national con-
tingents under international direction have uniformly been utilized.
This was the system employed by the U.N. in the Korean conflict
in 1950, in the Suez crisis of 1956, in the Congo in 1963, and in
Cyprus in 1964.100
3. Limitations on the Power and Functions of the U.N.
The power of the U.N. in the settlement of disputes is not
unlimited. Its authority does not extend to matters which are
99 Id. at 169-71.
100 See Lauterpacht, The United Nations Emergency Force (Basic Documents),
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. (Spec. Supp. 1960).
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essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. To this end
Article 2,(7) of the Charter provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
These provisions have been the subject of much discussion
and have elicited various opinions as to their intent and scope of
applicability. It would seem that although states are not required
under this article to submit matters which they consider to be
matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction-matters
which international law considers proper for determination by do-
mestic legislation only-matters of this nature which give rise to a
dispute or situation which is "likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security" thereupon cease to be matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.
These matters then become matters of international concern to
which the provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter relative
to the settlement of disputes apply. The provisions of Article 2(7)
of the Charter do not negate the authority of the U.N. to settle
in the manner provided by the Charter a dispute which has become
a matter of international concern. As Oppenheim has observed, in
practically every instance of a dispute or situation brought before
the Security Council, the provisions of Article 2(7) have been
invoked as a bar to the jurisdiction of the U.N. and in "most of
these cases, the plea has been disregarded on the ground either that
the matter was essentially international .. .or that the action to
be undertaken by the Security Council or the General Assembly did
not amount to intervention (it being confined to discussion, inves-
tigation, and recommendation), or on both grounds." 101
The U.N. offers a myriad of institutional means, both flexible
and impartial, for the accomplishment of peaceful change, the
peaceful settlement of disputes, and the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, which no regional or other collective
defense organization can provide. 0 2 The vast reservoir of diplomatic
methods and techniques which is available to the U.N. for the
1012 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 68, at 115-17; See Kelsen,, The Law of the
United Nations, 769-91 (1950); 1 Oppenheim, International Law 414-20 (8th ed.
Lauterpacht 1955); Kelsen, "Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations,"
55 Yale L. J. 997 (1946). -
102 Bloomfield, op. cit. supra note 88, at 143.
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maintenance of peace, furthermore, remains unexplored and unde-
veloped. It is anticipated that the immediate future will see a per-
fection within the U.N. of new forms and methods of deliberation
and techniques of reconciliation which the unique problems of the
era will require. 3 Although the U.N. has to date on the whole been
ineffective in resolving serious disputes between the great powers
either by recourse, or the threat to have recourse, to coercive meas-
ures under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, it has, by providing
the disputants a forum for discussion and an impartial agency for
the resolution of their controversies, effectively deterred the forcible
settlement of many disputes." 4
Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary General, in his thirteenth
Annual Report to the U.N. stated that the U.N. "as an instrument
for reconciliation and for world-wide cooperation .. .represents a
necessary addition to the traditional methods of diplomacy as
exercised on a bilateral or regional basis." 105 The U.N. with its well
established procedures provides a diplomatic instrument which is
immediately available to all members at all times. If disputing states
desire to avoid the formal procedures of the U.N. they may instead
have recourse immediately to the traditional methods of diplomacy,
for most members maintain permanent missions at the U.N. Addi-
tionally, they may have recourse to both formal U.N. conference
(public) diplomacy and traditional diplomacy. 6 The U.N. is both
a forum for diplomatic discussions and a diplomatic instrument
which facilitates, fosters, and insures the continuation of negotia-
tions-public, private, or both.
It is clear from the history of the U.N. that a U.N. presence,
either in the form of POC personnel, non-fighting international
forces, observers, committees of investigation and inquiry, or
through the good offices, mediation, and consultation of the U.N.,
is the most effective catalyst now available to the world community
in the sphere of preventive peace and the deterrence of indirect
aggression through subversion'O7 The potency of the U.N. in these
spheres rests in the ability of any nation to bring before it any
dispute, situation, or belligerent act which poses or could pose a
threat to international peace and security, and the fact that the
disputants must not only publicly defend their positions before
103 See statement made by Secretary General Hammarskjold in his tenth Annual
Report to the United Nations, cited in Hovet, "United Nations Diplomacy," XVII
J. Int'l Aff. No. 1, at 30 (1963).
104 Bloomfield, op. cit. supra note 88, at 43.
105 United Nations Annual Report of the Secretary General, 1957-58.
106 See Hovet, supra note 103, at 30.
107 See Gross, "UN Record and UN Dilemma," N. Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1958, p.
69 (Magazine).
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the U.N., but must also withstand the pressure of that organization
and that of world public opinion which has been organized and
developed by discussions before it, that they settle their disputes
peacefully. 10 8 That the U.N. provides an effective instrumentality
for organizing and publicizing the disapprobation of the world
community toward an unjustifiable recourse to forcible or coer-
cive 109 measures in the settlement of disputes was forcibly demon-
strated by the action taken in the U.N. at the time of the Korean
conflict in 1950.
In conclusion, the U.N. possesses an unusual potential for peace.
It provides an important medium for the development of plans for
the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements. These
matters, including the nuclear problem, are, of course, multilateral
ones and the U.N., a neutral, impartial, and universal organization,
is logically the one in which agreements on these matters should be
developed and concluded. Only the U.N. is in a position to place
strong pressure on the nuclear powers to come to an agreement
which is adequate for the peace and security of the world
community.110
108 See Hovet, supra note 103, at 31.
1o9 Gross, supra note 107, at 54.
110 Bloomfield, op. cit. supra note 88, at 94-95.
